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involves participants interacting in the process of completing a collaborative task. One
central concept that has been investigated in quite some detail is that of common ground
(e.g., Clark, 1996; Clark & Schäfer, 1989; Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983; Clark &
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Fussell & Krauss, 1989, 1992; Isaacs & Clark, 1987).
In brief, common ground can be defined as the knowledge, assumptions, and beliefs
that people in interaction know (or assume) they share. When people enter a conver-
sation, they may already share certain knowledge relating to the topic of talk, and they
adjust their talk accordingly with respect to this mutual knowledge (Isaacs & Clark,
1987). This usually involves interactants being more efficient in their communication,
for example, by abbreviating their speech. However, at the same time they must ensure
that they communicate in a manner clear enough for their interlocutor to understand
what is being said; this has been referred to as the principle of optimal design (Clark
et al., 1983). Apart from entering conversations with some degree of common ground,
people build up common ground over the course of a conversation through the contri-
butions they make. A well-researched aspect in association to common ground is how
people refer to entities and in particular how their manner of referring changes with
increasing common ground. One experiment illustrating this process was carried out
by Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986). In this experiment, participants completed a col-
laborative card-sorting task (the cards showed abstract figures from a Chinese tangram
game). It was found that to be able to repeatedly refer to the figures with increasing
efficiency, the interactants quickly agreed on certain descriptions or labels and thus
established these as common ground. For example, at the beginning of the experiment,
a certain figure was referred to as “a person who’s ice skating, except they’re sticking
two arms out in front”; toward the end of the experiment when common ground had
been established, the same figure was referred to simply as “the ice skater” (p. 12).
This example, which can be considered representative of the general change that the
referential descriptions underwent with repeated use, shows that common ground can
lead to more elliptical speech. Generally, utterances that are designed for addressees
who share certain knowledge with the speaker tend to be less complex and rely on
mutually shared understanding of meaning.
Apart from experimental investigations, examples of natural conversation support
the notion that speakers in talk bear in mind what their addressees do or do not know.
Goodwin (1981) introduced the terms knowing and unknowing recipient in this con-
text to describe differences in language use and gaze patterns that speakers employ
when conversing with recipients of different knowledge status, in this case recipients
who are familiar with the events talked about (knowing recipients) and recipients
who are not (unknowing recipients). Vygotsky (1934/1986) talked about the phe-
nomenon of speakers anticipating recipients’ knowledge in association with his dis-
cussion of inner speech, or endophasy, which he claims is elliptical, like external
speech can be in certain situations: “A simplified syntax, condensation, and a greatly
reduced number of words characterize the tendency to predication that appears in
external speech when the partners know what is going on” (p. 238; see also
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Garfinkel’s, 1967, analysis of “some essential features of common understandings”
for further evidence for this phenomenon from natural talk).
However, these investigations into common ground and recipient designed talk in
experimentally elicited and natural talk have focused on verbal communication,
largely neglecting the nonverbal communicational channels that interlocutors use
alongside speech. The importance of including nonlinguistic information in future
analyses of common ground, and conversational interaction more generally,
becomes clear if we consider a particular communicational channel, namely iconic
hand gesture. Iconic gestures have been described by McNeill (1985, 1992) as imag-
istic representations of the hands and arms referring to concrete concepts that the
speaker has in mind and intends to convey. An iconic gesture and its accompanying
speech share the same semantic reference point; however, the information that is
encoded in the two communicational channels is often not exactly the same, as ges-
ture and speech tend to exhibit different semantic aspects of the idea to be expressed.
An oft-cited example of an iconic gesture is the following (McNeill, 1992):1
“she [chases him out again]”
[hand appears to swing an object through the air] (p. 13)
In this example, the speech informs us that two characters are involved in the action,
that one of them is chasing the other, and that this is a recurring event. The accom-
panying iconic gesture, on the other hand, reveals that the chasing is done using a
weapon (in this case an umbrella). Examples such as these, where the gesture car-
ries information that is not contained in the speech, are common in spontaneous dis-
course and lend support to the notion that an utterance is formed by both speech and
gesture and that therefore gesture is as much a part of language as speech (cf.
Bavelas & Chovil, 2000; Clark, 1996; Kendon, 1980, 2000; McNeill, 1985, 1992).
Different theories have been proposed suggesting reasons as to why speakers make
these gestures when they talk. Some researchers claim that gesturing benefits mainly
the speaker himself or herself, as it helps to access lexical items in the mental lexicon
during the speech-production process (e.g., Butterworth & Hadar, 1989; Hadar &
Butterworth, 1997; Krauss, Chen, & Gottesman, 2000; Krauss, Morrel-Samuels, &
Colasante, 1991; Rimé & Shiaratura, 1991). From this theoretical perspective, any
communicative effects, if they exist, are mainly accidental. Another core theory of
gesture production that considers the function of speech-accompanying imagistic
hand gestures to be primarily communicative and views them as strongly motivated
by aspects of the social-interactional context has been proposed. Apart from the many
individual examples of gesture use observed and described by Kendon (1985, 2004)
supporting this theory, there has been corroborating experimental evidence (e.g.,
Alibali, Heath, & Meyers, 2001; Bavelas, Kenwood, Johnson, & Phillips, 2002;
Beattie & Aboudan, 1994; Holler & Beattie, 2003; Özyürek, 2000, 2002).
The intriguing question of why speakers produce gestures has spurred many
researchers to investigate whether they actually communicate any meaningful
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information (e.g., Graham & Argyle, 1975; Riseborough, 1981; Rogers, 1978).
Perhaps the most compelling evidence to date comes from a series of fairly recent
studies. Beattie and Shovelton (1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2002; see also Beattie, 2003)
played video clips of individual iconic gestures produced by speakers narrating car-
toon stories to independent respondents and questioned them about the information
the gestures conveyed to them. Methodologically, Beattie and Shovelton used what
they named a semantic feature approach. This involved interviewing the respon-
dents about the information communicated by the gestures in a systematic and
detailed fashion using questions that focus on a whole range of core semantic fea-
tures (e.g., size, shape, movement, relative position). A robust finding emerging
from these studies is that, first, iconic gestures do communicate a significant
amount of semantic information both in the absence of and in addition to speech.
Second, they found that particularly information about the size of entities and their
relative position was communicated well by iconic gestures.
In a more recent study, Beattie and Shovelton (2006) tested whether the encoding
of size information in iconic gestures is at all related to the significance of this infor-
mation in the semantic context (in terms of the story line) in which it is embedded.
They found that size information was encoded mainly gesturally when it was judged
as highly important in the context of what was happening in the story the speakers
were telling. Interestingly, and probably quite counterintuitively, the information
was not represented verbally in the majority of those instances. Furthermore, when
the information was considered to be of low importance, it was encoded only ver-
bally in most of the cases. Their conclusion was that when “size matters,” it is rep-
resented predominantly in gesture only.
However, these studies leave one important question unanswered, namely whether
the information contained in gestures is exclusively determined by the semantic con-
tent of a message (and the significance this information carries in the context of the
story line) or whether the pragmatics of conversation also exert an influence in this
respect. We therefore need to gain further insight into how speakers’ conversational
goals and interactional processes influence the kind of information gestures represent
and communicate.
A study by Gerwing and Bavelas (2004) has already made an important step into
this direction by investigating the influence of common ground on gestural behav-
iour. In their experiment, one participant, who had played with a certain set of toys,
had to explain to two other participants (in separate trials) what he or she did during
the playing phase (without the toys being present). One of the participants who lis-
tened to the descriptions had played with the same set of toys, the other one with a
different set of toys, and the speaker was aware of this. Thus, Gerwing and Bavelas
created circumstances in which the recipient of the description either shared certain
knowledge (i.e., about the toys) with the speaker or not. The findings showed that
when speakers talk to recipients with whom they share this kind of common ground,
their gestures are less complex, less precise, and less informative. Furthermore, they
found that with the progression of the discourse, the information encoded in the
gestures changed or was emphasised differently with those parts of information that
were newly introduced into the discourse being made more salient gesturally (e.g., by
representing it more precisely). Given information (defined as what the listener or
audience is expected to already know; Haviland & Clark, 1974, p. 512), on the other
hand, tended to fade from gesture with the progression of the discourse in that the
respective physical features became less salient and were often entirely eliminated
from the gestures. This finding relates to literature on verbal markers of information
status (e.g., Schiffrin, 1987) as they demonstrate that gestures may be used to distin-
guish new from given information. Overall, the authors convincingly concluded that
common ground affects not only speech but also the physical form of gestures.
These are very interesting findings, and the study provides an important stepping
stone for further investigations taking a more detailed look at certain issues. In
Gerwing and Bavelas’s (2004) study, the influence of common ground on the physical
form of gestures was examined. What we do not yet know is how common ground
affects the range of semantic information encoded in gestures (i.e., how, or in which
way, the gestures become “less informative” and whether any particular pattern exists
that characterises this process of becoming elliptical). Moreover, we do not know how
common ground influences the interplay between the two communicational channels
gesture and speech. For this we need to take into consideration the verbal side of utter-
ances. Providing first insights in these respects is the aim of the present study.
To do so, we limit our focus here to one single semantic dimension, namely size
information. The reason for this is that previous studies have found that this type of
information is particularly well communicated by iconic gestures, and that we already
have some knowledge about how gesture and speech interact in the representation of
size information (as seen above). The study described in this article uses a referential
communication task that does not require speakers telling a narrative and that there-
fore eliminates the effects of semantic importance that information can receive from
being embedded in a story line. For the successful completion of the task used here,
it is necessary that speakers navigate their addressees through a picture showing a
fairly busy scene (which the addressee cannot see at this point) to locate a target entity
within this picture. To do so, the speaker has to refer to other entities in the picture in
a clear manner, which allows the recipient to identify the entities from a large number
of alternative entities reliably and without much effort. The stimulus pictures con-
tain some particularly large entities that serve as landmarks in the process of locating
the target. The crucial manipulation is that in one condition speakers are talking to
addressees with whom they do not share any knowledge about the particular entities
(i.e., their size). In the other condition, they talk to addressees who have seen the stim-
ulus material beforehand and who were thus familiar with these entities and their size.
Hence, making reference to the entities is equally relevant in both conditions (as the
same outcome has to be achieved; i.e., correctly locating the target), but in one con-
dition, information about the entities’ size is new information, whereas in the other
condition it is given as common ground does exist.
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The central question this investigation tackles is whether speakers’ knowledge of
their addressees’ familiarity with the entities’ size affects how they draw on the gesture
and speech modalities to communicate this information. Our assumption is that com-
mon ground does influence the semantic interplay of gesture and speech because pre-
vious research has shown that common ground affects verbal language use and other
research has shown that it affects gesture. If we do find an influence of common
ground on how speakers use gesture and speech to encode size information, this would
have important implications for gesture production theories. However, at this stage we
cannot make any precise predictions about how exactly common ground may influ-
ence gesture-speech interaction. One possibility is that when given information is
omitted from speech, it is not represented gesturally because speakers may not per-
ceive the need to communicate this information in either modality because of it being
common ground. Another possibility is that the two systems somehow work around
each other. For example, speakers may consider it unnecessary to provide certain infor-
mation verbally, but they may represent it in gesture. This way gesture could be used
as some kind of backup system (to convey information that should be considered given
by the recipient but where the speaker is not certain that this is the case). Another pos-
sibility is that information that is represented gesturally in talk designed for unknow-
ing recipients fades from gesture when common ground exists (as has been observed
in previous research) but that the information is encoded verbally instead. The present
investigation will provide insight into what happens verbally and gesturally when




A total of 40 students from the University of Manchester took part in the experi-
ment in pairs. Of the 20 pairs, 4 pairs were excluded from the analysis (2 speakers were
not English native speakers, 1 pair did not correctly follow the experimental instruc-
tions given to them, and, large parts of the talk of the fourth speaker were inaudible on
the video recording). The remaining 16 pairs were randomly allocated to two condi-
tions, with 8 pairs taking part in each. The pairs were mainly same-gender dyads,
namely 7 out of 8 pairs (6 female dyads, 1 male dyad) in one condition (KRC) and
6 out of 8 pairs (3 male dyads, 3 female dyads) in the other condition (URC; please
see Experimental Design and Procedure section for an explanation of condition labels).
In both conditions, one mixed-gender dyad with a male speaker and a female recipient
and one mixed-gender dyad with a female speaker and a male recipient (URC) took
part.
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Materials
The stimulus material consisted of five unrelated pictures from a children’s book
called Where’s Wally? The Wonder Book (Handford, 1999). Each picture showed a
busy scene with many different objects and characters performing various activities.
Two versions were created for each of the five pictures, the original picture plus a
version that was identical to the original but with the character Wally inserted into
the picture. For the analysis, three pictures were chosen from the five (see Appendix
A).2 Recipients used sheets showing the original pictures to indicate where they
believed Wally to be, based on the speaker’s description (see below). The experiment
was filmed split screen using two wall-mounted cameras, providing frontal views of
the participants.
Experimental Design and Procedure
The study used a between-subjects design with two conditions, one which was called
the knowing recipient condition (KRC) and another called the unknowing recipient con-
dition (URC). In the URC, participants were asked to sit down on two chairs facing each
other, and their choice of seats determined whether they would fulfill the role of speaker
or recipient in the experiment. The positioning of the chairs provided the speaker with
the view of a wall onto which the stimulus material (Version B of the pictures, showing
Wally) was later projected. The recipient looked into the opposite direction and there-
fore could not see the projection. In the KRC, the same setup was used, but it was pre-
ceded by another phase of the experiment. This phase involved the stimulus material
(Version A of the pictures, without Wally) being projected onto a different part of the
wall. Both participants stood next to each other facing the projection. The speaker was
asked to talk to the recipient about the picture, what it showed and what was going on,
providing a good overview and summary. This way, common ground between speaker
and recipient was induced in that both would have shared knowledge of the scene. After
this first phase, participants were asked to sit down in their chairs again and the pro-
jected picture was swapped to the respective matching one that included Wally. From
this point onward, both conditions followed the same procedure. The speaker was asked
to describe to the recipient Wally’s position in the picture so that they would be able to
locate him correctly on a copy of the respective picture (Version A) handed to them after
each description. The same procedure was repeated for each picture (the order of pre-
sentation was randomised).
Focus of Analysis
Certain entities that speakers frequently referred to when describing Wally’s posi-
tion and that were considered rather big in the pictorial context in that they were
depicted were chosen (two knots in a pipe in Picture 1, a dome-shaped house in
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Picture 2, a banana bridge in Picture 3; see Appendix A); their general perception as
being big entities was validated by asking 16 independent, naïve judges to look at
the stimulus material and rate the size of each of these entities on a 7-point Likert-
type scale ranging from very small to very big. The average rating for the house was
5.6; for the bridge it was 4.9, for Knot A it was 5.3, and for Knot B it was 5.3, show-
ing that they were all perceived as fairly big or big.
Coding Criteria for Speech
The descriptions of Wally’s position in the pictures (which consisted of utterances
such as “then go to the knot in the pipe and he’s right next to it, above a multilayered
cake”) were coded for references made to the selected entities; each mentioning of the
entities was counted as one reference (e.g., “that dome house,” “a knot,” “the banana
bridge”). Cases in which the entities were only mentioned in verb form, such as “a
knotted pipe,” were excluded, as the focus of references like these is more on other
entities, in this case the pipe rather than the knot (five such references occurred).
Classification of Hand Gestures
To identify and analyse gestures, McNeill’s (1992) classification scheme was
used. Hand gestures that represent semantic information and refer to concrete con-
cepts are classed as iconic gestures. Rhythmical, beat-like movements following the
pace and intonation of speech are called beats and do not represent any imagistic
information. Pointing gestures to fictive and real objects in the surroundings of a
speaker are called deictic gestures. The latter two types were excluded from the
analyses, beats because they fulfill an essentially different function from imagistic
hand gestures (viz., the emphasis of certain parts of an utterance using rhythmical
cues only) and deictic gestures because although they fulfill referential functions in
talk, they do so without representing semantic information themselves. Concerning
the gestures that accompanied the references made to the selected entities, only one
gesture classed as a beat and one gesture classed as a deictic gesture occurred, and
these two cases were excluded from the analysis. Perhaps not very surprisingly, no
metaphoric gestures occurred in association with the referential task completed here.
All gestures analysed in association with the references made to the selected entities
were therefore iconic gestures.
Categorization of Referential Utterances
Each reference made to the selected entities was categorised as a verbal reference
(e.g., the banana bridge), a verbal reference + size marker (e.g., the big banana
bridge), a verbal reference + gesture (e.g., the banana bridge + hand movement trac-
ing the bridge in the air), or a verbal reference + size marker + gesture (e.g., the big
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banana bridge + a hand movement tracing the bridge). No references were made
using only gesture.
Analysis of Gestures
For analysing the size information encoded in each gesture, a judgment was made
using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from very small to very big. Each individ-
ual gesture was judged as “representing the entity as” being very small, small, fairly
small, neither big nor small, fairly big, big or very big. One of the authors (R.S.) and
an independent judge who was blind to the experimental conditions (as was the other
judge) and hypotheses, but who had been shown the stimulus material and was expe-
rienced in coding gestures for the semantic information they represent, both rated
each gesture on this scale. They did not hear the speech to prevent their judgments
from being influenced by whether the speakers did or did not use size markers in
their speech or any verbal cues indicating that their talk was designed for a knowing
or an unknowing recipient.
Because exact agreement is much harder to reach using a 7-point scale than when
using a considerably more limited number of scale points or coding categories, we
relaxed the criterion for agreement so that directly adjacent points on the scale were
considered as the judges having reached consensus (cf. Stemler, 2004). This resulted
in 74% agreement. All disagreements were caused by only 2 scale points of discrep-
ancy, except from one case where the judgments differed by 3 scale points. These dis-
agreements were discussed, and it was found that the averages of both judges’ scores
for each individual gesture resolved the disagreements satisfactorily, apart from for the
one case where the discrepancy in the scores was 3 scale points (for this gesture, a final
score of 4 was decided because the gesture seemed to not clearly represent the entity
as either big or small). The average scores were also calculated for those cases where
the judges’ scores were not identical but adjacent scale points.
In one part of the subsequent analysis, the judges’ average size scores were used
to create two categories, that is, one including gestures encoding the actual size of
the entities (i.e., gestures that were scored as 5, 6, or 7) and one including gestures
that did not encode the accurate size information (i.e., gestures that were scored
using the scale points 1, 2, or 3). Those gestures that had received an average score
of 4 (this concerned 8 gestures; 4 of these had received a score of 4 after they had
been rounded accordingly), that is, less clear-cut cases, were excluded from this part
of the analysis for the purpose of statistical testing.
Results
The total number of references included in the analysis was 147,3 of which 72 were
used by speakers in the KRC and 75 by speakers from the URC. The following
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analysis focuses on how speakers used gesture and speech to refer to the respective
entities. The verbal and gestural references made were assigned to four categories (see
Method section). Table 1 provides an overview of how the data distributed across these
analytic categories. A G test showed that the proportional distribution of the data was
significantly different in the two conditions, Gadj (3, N = 147) = 15.73, p < .005.
As can be seen from Table 1, speakers talking to knowing recipients made refer-
ences mainly exclusively verbally (55/72 = 76%), whereas speakers talking to
unknowing recipients accompanied most of their references with gestures (41/75 =
55%). Furthermore, although speakers in both conditions used size markers together
with their referential expressions to an equal extent (KRC: 16/72 = 22%, URC:
16/75 = 21%), a difference emerges when this number of references is split up
according to whether they were accompanied by gesture or not. References includ-
ing size markers made by speakers from the KRC were predominantly purely verbal
(10/16 = 63%), whereas references including size markers produced by speakers in
the URC were more likely to be accompanied by gesture (12/16 = 75%).
Analysis of Size Information in Gesture
Apart from the frequency with which gestures were used by speakers in the two
conditions, it is necessary to analyse whether these gestures actually represented
accurate information about the size of the respective entities and to compare the
experimental conditions in this respect. A Mann-Whitney U test was performed on
the judges’ size scores (see Method section) by calculating an average score for each
speaker (sum of size scores of the individual gestures produced/number of gestures
produced; see Appendix B for the resulting average scores). The result revealed a
significant difference between the two groups (U = 4, n1 = 7, n2 = 5, p < .03), with
the size scores of gestures produced in the KRC being lower than the scores in the
URC. In other words, on average, the speakers talking to knowing recipients repre-
sented the entities as significantly smaller than the speakers in the URC.
For the further analysis, the gestures were categorised either as representing the
respective entity accurately as big or as representing the entity “wrongly” as small
(see Method section). The data are shown in Table 2. A G test showed that those ges-
tures that did not represent the actual size of the large entities were significantly
associated with the KRC, whereas those that did encode this information were asso-
ciated with the URC, Gadj (1, N = 50) = 17.65, p < .001.
Of course, one could argue that perhaps an influence here is whether a respective
entity has already been referred to before with a gesture. Hence, only first gestural
references (see Table 3) have been taken into account to test the same association,
which showed that the pattern still holds, Gadj (1, N = 19) = 8.59, p < .005.
Another possible influential factor in this respect is whether a speaker has
referred to the entities in question using speech only, before making a gesture. To test
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this, it was not just possible to compare the two conditions in the same way taking
into account only those gestures that were actually first references (i.e., not preceded
by any verbal references to the respective entity either). This is because there would
have been only one gesture in the KRC because of the existence of the “prephase,”
in which participants usually referred to the respective entities. One other possibil-
ity is to look at those cases in the URC in which gestures were not preceded by any
verbal (or gestural) references, which concerns 9 gestures, and compare them with
those that were preceded by a verbal reference, which concerned 4 gestures. Out of
the 9 gestures, 7 (78%) did encode size information, whereas 2 (22%) did not. Out
of the 4 that were preceded by a verbal reference, 2 represented size information,
whereas 2 did not (i.e., 50% each). This indeed very small set of data suggests that
when gestures are preceded by a verbal reference to the same entity, this seems to
slightly decrease the likelihood of accurate size information being represented ges-
turally, but not to a statistically significantly extent, Gadj (1, N = 13) = 0.82, ns.
Table 1
Data Distribution Across the Four Analytic Categories for Both Conditions
Verbal Reference
— + Size Marker + Gesture + Size Marker + Gesture
Knowing recipient condition 45 10 11 6
Unknowing recipient condition 30 4 29 12
Table 2
Frequency of Gestures That Did and Did Not
Encode Size Information by Condition
Gestures Not Encoding Size Gestures Encoding Size
Knowing recipient condition 12 1
Unknowing recipient condition 10 27
Table 3
Frequency of First Gestural References That Did and
Did Not Encode Size Information by Condition
First Gestural References First Gestural References
Not Encoding Size Encoding Size
Knowing recipient condition 5 0
Unknowing recipient condition 4 10
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However, a much larger corpus of data is needed to investigate this aspect further to
allow for drawing firm conclusions.
The final part of the analysis involves going back to the data distribution across
the analytic categories used here; however, this time only those gestures and verbal
utterances that actually did encode accurate size information are taken into account.
Table 4 provides an overview of these data. It is obvious at a glance that the experi-
mental conditions differ quite considerably.
A G test showed that this difference in the proportional distribution of the data is
statistically significant, Gadj (2, N = 42) = 23.85, p < .001. If we compare individual
categories, however, no significant association is found between experimental con-
dition and whether size is encoded in gesture only (verbal reference + gesture encod-
ing accurate size) or in gesture and speech (verbal reference + size marker + gesture
encoding accurate size), Gadj (1, N = 28) = 1.36, ns.4 But if we compare the experi-
mental conditions with respect to whether size information is encoded in speech only
(verbal reference + size marker) or in gesture only (verbal reference + gesture encod-
ing accurate size), a significant association is found, Gadj (1, N = 32) = 21.70, p <
.001. Size is predominantly encoded verbally in the KRC and predominantly gestu-
rally in the URC. Furthermore, to compare whether the conditions differ in terms of
whether size information is encoded in speech only or in a reference that involves
gesture (either as the only carrier of size information, or in addition to speech), we
collapsed the categories verbal reference + gesture encoding accurate size and ver-
bal reference + size marker + gesture encoding accurate size and found a significant
association, Gadj (1, N = 42) = 21.62, p < .001. When speakers talked to unknowing
recipients, they were significantly more likely to represent size in gesture or gesture
and speech, whereas speakers talking to knowing recipients were more likely to rep-
resent size information verbally, without representing it gesturally.
The subsequent generic examples make clearer what this result means in terms of the
actual verbal and gestural behaviour of the participants (see Figures 1-3). When con-
veying information about the size of the entities, speakers in the URC were much more
likely to say, for example, “He’s directly above the banana bridge” while moving their
hand from the left side in a large upward semicircle toward the right, reaching into the
Table 4
Frequency of References Including Verbal and/or
Gestural Size Information by Condition
Verbal Reference
+ Gesture + Size Marker + Gesture
+ Size Marker Encoding Size Encoding Size
Knowing recipient condition 10 0 1
Unknowing recipient condition 4 18 9
periphery of their gesture space (as in Figure 3, lower row of pictures). Or they
would use the same gesture to accompany verbal utterances that also represented the
size information, such as “He’s directly above the big banana bridge.” In the KRC,
however, speakers would typically say “He’s directly above the big banana bridge”
while moving their hand a very short way from left to right in front of the chest,
drawing a very small upward semicircle in the air (as in Figure 3, upper row of pic-
tures), therefore not conveying any accurate size information in their gesture.
Discussion
The analyses described in this article have led to a number of important findings
that illuminate our understanding of how speakers in talk communicate semantic
information. The crucial question was whether the encoding of size information
would be affected by common ground and, if so, how this influences the semantic
interaction of the two modalities, iconic gesture and speech, in the representation of
this information. First, it was discovered that the pattern of how speakers use these
communicational channels to refer to large entities differs significantly when they
talk to knowing as compared to unknowing recipients. More precisely, using ges-
tures to refer to the selected entities was considerably more typical for speakers talk-
ing to unknowing recipients than for speakers talking to knowing recipients.
Furthermore, when speakers included size information in their verbal references,
those talking to unknowing recipients tended to accompany their references with
gestures; speakers talking to knowing recipients, on the other hand, used predomi-
nantly exclusively verbal references. Second, those gestures that did encode the
accurate size of the large entities were mainly made by speakers who talked to
unknowing recipients, and those that did not encode size information were propor-
tionally more often made by speakers talking to knowing recipients. Overall, speak-
ers who talked to unknowing recipients represented size information predominantly
in gesture, or in gesture and speech, whereas those speakers who talked to knowing
recipients represented size information predominantly in speech but hardly at all in
gesture. Thus, our findings are in line with Gerwing and Bavelas’s (2004) finding
that common ground influences gestural communication. At the same time, they go
beyond this previous research, as we have shown how the representation of a partic-
ular semantic feature is affected and how the two modalities, gesture and speech,
interact in the representation of this information.
Furthermore, the findings provide interesting insights regarding the ellipsis of
speech characteristic for talk designed for knowing recipients (see Introduction).
Regarding the present data, it is in fact not the case that the verbal references were
condensed or contained less information when speakers talked to knowing recipi-
ents; on the contrary, the verbal references seemed to include more information (i.e.,
about the size of the respective entities). At first glance, this may seem slightly at
16 Journal of Language and Social Psychology
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odds with the phenomenon of elliptical speech found in previous investigations.
However, taking both sides of the referential utterances (i.e., speech and gesture) into
consideration leads to somewhat different insights. With respect to those cases in
which the size information was represented both gesturally and verbally when
speakers talked to unknowing recipients, common ground can in fact be seen as hav-
ing led to more elliptical utterances, as the information was dropped from the ges-
tures and thus represented only verbally. With respect to those cases in which size
information was represented only in gesture when speakers talked to unknowing
recipients, one could say that the information “swapped channels,” as it tended to be
encoded verbally instead. This means that in this case the utterances do not neces-
sarily become more elliptical (although the gestural part of them does), but the pack-
aging of the respective information changes. This accentuates the need for
considering both the linguistic and the imagistic side of utterances.
The present findings lend strong support to the theory that predicts that gestures
are socially motivated in their occurrence and influenced by social processes in
Figure 1
Gestural References Made to “The Knot” Classed as
Small (Top) and Big (Bottom)
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terms of the information they represent and the functions they fulfill. The findings
thus show that those theories that explain the occurrence of gesture by linking it
exclusively to speech production processes and deny any link to the speaker’s com-
municational intent cannot be right. Based on the present findings, we cannot (and
do not intend to) exclude the possibility that gestures may also play a facilitative role
in the speech production process, but we are able to conclude that this cannot be their
sole function. In this sense, the findings corroborate past research (e.g., Alibali et al.,
2001; Bavelas et al., 2002; Beattie & Aboudan, 1994; Holler & Beattie, 2003;
Özyürek, 2000, 2002), and we can conclude with increased certainty that speakers
do gesture for their interlocutors.
Furthermore, we can learn from the insights gained through this investigation that
researchers interested in the effects of common ground on language use should take
into account that speech and gesture together form an utterance. We have seen that
common ground affects not only speech but also the information represented in ges-
ture. In many cases, size information was represented in gesture but not in speech
Figure 2
Gestural References Made to “The House” Classed
as Small (Top) and Big (Bottom)
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and vice versa, and this semantic interaction was crucially influenced by common
ground. Thus, only when considering the semantic interplay of speech and gesture
can we truly discover if and how an utterance is designed for a certain recipient.
The present findings may be explained in the following way. Those speakers talk-
ing to unknowing recipients had to newly convey the size information to help create
a mental image of the respective entities from scratch. Speakers talking to knowing
recipients, on the other hand, were aware that the size of the entities constituted part
of an existing mental representation as the recipients had previously seen the stimu-
lus pictures. Thus, the communicational intent of the speakers talking to knowing
recipients will have differed from that of the speakers in the URC. In one case, they
were aiming at simply reactivating existing knowledge, whereas in the other, they
aimed at helping to construct a new mental image. It appears that although the latter
is preferentially done using gesture or gesture and speech, the former is preferen-
tially done using only speech (at least with respect to the representation of size infor-
mation in referential communication).
Figure 3
Gestural References Made to “The Bridge” Classed
as Small (Top) and Big (Bottom)
20 Journal of Language and Social Psychology
In the light of this, it seems that the words “the big bridge” (for example), when
used by a speaker talking to a knowing recipient, were not primarily aimed at convey-
ing information about the size of the entity but simply at referring effectively to some-
thing that had been seen and/or mentioned before. Haviland and Clark (1974) stated
that if given information has an antecedent in memory, this allows listeners to anchor
incoming information connected with this antecedent information quickly and easily.
The words “the big bridge” may thus function as some kind of “verbal tag,” as it were,
which would readily and reliably identify the respective entity for the knowing recip-
ient (and allow him or her to connect new information to it, such as the location of
another target in relation to the bridge). The present analysis has therefore shown that
gestures may fulfill functions over and above getting semantic information across to a
recipient. In line with Gerwing and Bavelas (2004), we may conclude that one other
important function of gesture is to mark information status and thus to guide the recip-
ient’s comprehension of incoming information. This kind of potential “channelling
function” of certain gestures may even result in a processing advantage for the recipi-
ent; however, future research would have to confirm this assumption.
Furthermore, the results presented in this article expand on Beattie and Shovelton
(2006) because they provide evidence that how size information is encoded in gesture
and speech is also influenced by a speaker’s communicational intent and the particular
conversational context in which talk is embedded, not only the semantic context (e.g., a
story line). In the present study, conveying the size information fulfilled important com-
municational functions in both experimental conditions—but these appear to be quite
different functions that affected the use of gesture and speech in different ways. Thus,
how the speakers encoded size information was here directly influenced by the com-
municational context, in particular the recipients’ knowledge. To gain a more compre-
hensive understanding of how speakers communicate using gesture and speech, we
need to take into account the semantic information a speaker tries to convey and the
pragmatic functions gestures may fulfill within a particular conversation.
Of course, the study presented in this article has certain limitations. One of these
is that in the present study, the participants did not verbally interact. Instead, the
speakers described the scene to the extent that they believed was sufficient, which
can be compared to someone taking an extended turn, for example when telling a
short story or a joke. In this type of interaction, listeners usually do not interrupt and
may predominantly interact with the speakers through backchannel responses and
nonverbal cues. Therefore, future research will need to focus on more collaborative
interaction. This would provide us with important insights into how participants in
conversation work together to establish and use common ground and what role their
gestural behaviour plays in this process. Another limitation of this study is that it
focuses exclusively on size information. Although investigating the gestural and ver-
bal representation of this type of semantic information was the obvious first step (for
reasons stated in the Introduction), future research will have to examine other types
of semantic information to provide a more comprehensive view. Currently, research
that tackles both of the aforementioned points is being conducted.
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Furthermore, it could be argued that the gender pairings of the participants are a
potential limitation of this study because of possible differences in gestural behav-
iour. However, with regard to the gestural behaviour of the male dyads as compared
to the female dyads, no noteworthy difference exists; considering the number of ref-
erences they accompanied with gesture, the percentage values ranged from 33% to
76% for the speakers in the male dyads and from 22% to 71% for the speakers in the
female dyads. On average, both male and female dyads accompanied 50% of their
references made to the target entities with gestures (male dyads = 49.75%, female
dyads = 49.67%). Similarly, the size information encoded gesturally varied between
the scores of 1.8 to 5.6 for the male dyads (average score = 3.5) and between 2.1 and
5.7 for the female dyads (average score = 3.7). Hence, the gestural behaviour of the
speakers in the female dyads is not markedly different from that of the male dyads
in this experimental task. Thus, the fact that the URC had more male dyads does not
appear to be a confounding factor. In the mixed-gender dyads with male speakers,
the percentages of references accompanied with gestures are 17% (URC) and 23%
(KRC). This may hint at a general difference in gesture use between mixed-gender
and same-gender dyads, with gestures here appearing slightly less frequent in
mixed-gender dyads. However, this should have had no effect on the present find-
ings, as one male speaker talked to a female recipient in each condition (their aver-
age size scores differed considerably—7.0 and 2.0, respectively—in line with the
experimental effect). Finally, in the URC a female speaker talked to a male recipi-
ent, and this gender pairing did not occur in the other condition. However, this
female speaker did not gesture with the respective referential expressions, hence the
part of the analysis based on gestures size scores cannot have been affected. With
regard to gesture frequency, it has to be noted that three other female speakers who
talked to female recipients (KRC) did not gesture with their referential expressions
either. To assume that the female speaker’s lack of gesturing in the mixed-gender
dyad is attributable to her talking to a male recipient rather than a female recipient
seems therefore not justified. However, generally, gender differences in gestural
behaviour need to be more systematically addressed to allow for firmer conclusions
as to whether gender does or does not have an influence on gesture use in different
contexts. Previous research has yielded mixed findings, with some studies showing
no significant gender differences (e.g., Duncan & Fiske, 1977; Kennedy & Camden,
1983) and others showing differences (e.g., Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, &
Keating, 1988; Ickes & Barnes, 1977; Rosenfeld, 1966). With respect to future
research, it would be particularly interesting to investigate whether gender differ-
ences in gesture use exist in the context of referential communication.
In conclusion, this article has revealed important insights into how speakers shape
utterances that fit the communicational circumstances using gesture and speech.
Thus, the findings have shed further light on why people gesture when they speak
and how they gesture. We have also suggested how gesture may be pragmatically
functioning with regard to discourse structure and discourse comprehension. These
are important steps toward increasing our understanding of human communication.




Holler, Stevens / Gesture, Speech, and Size Information 23
(continued)
Appendix A (continued)
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Appendix A (continued)
Note: The black cross indicates Wally’s position in the Version B pictures (see Method section). The cir-
cles refer to the target entities. Both crosses and circles are included here merely for the purpose of clar-
ification and were not part of the original stimulus material.
Source: Illustrations © 1997 Martin Handford. From Where’s Wally? The Wonder Book, by Martin
Handford. Reproduced by permission of Walker Books Ltd, London SE11 5HJ.
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Appendix B
Overview of the Average Size Scores for Each Speaker’s Gestures by Condition
Average Size Score









1. Speech is marked through quotation marks. The gesture is described underneath in brackets. The
brackets around the spoken words mark the start and the end points of the gesture.
2. Before carrying out the experiment, we had planned to analyse material from only three pictures
because of the time-consuming nature of the analysis of this kind of behavioural data and to pick those
three pictures with which participants would produce the most data. Reasons for excluding the respective
two pictures were that one of them showed a scene involving several cubes with letters and numbers on it;
many speakers therefore simply described the target entity’s position, for example, by saying, “He’s above
the cube with the N on.” Regarding the second picture, the scene included very small details and entities
that looked very similar so that speakers could often not make out what was depicted and were thus not
able to carry out the referential task properly. Although both cases are potentially interesting with regard
to gesture use (i.e., how gesture use is affected when referents are readily identifiable through verbal labels
or when there is uncertainty or ambiguity about the referents), systematic manipulation and separate analy-
ses are required to investigate them. Moreover, in the referential descriptions that the speakers did provide
in association with these two pictures, they did not refer to any particularly big or small entities.
3. Henceforth, the term references means references to the selected entities.
4. The significance decisions for this and the following two tests are based on the Bonferroni-adjusted
alpha level (.05/3 = .017).References
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